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Redan Battery and the Battle of Queenston Heights
Suzanne Plousos

The Battle of Queenston Heights bears great significance for Canadian War of 1812 enthusiasts.
This victory cemented Niagara Loyalists’ sympathy for the British cause and inspired militia units to stand
against the American invasion of Upper Canada. When Major General Isaac Brock fell leading a desperate
charge to retake Redan Battery, he gave Canadians an exemplary hero. Even today, the monument honoring
Brock towers over the landscape, denoting the significance of the Battle of Queenston Heights in forging a
new sense of Canadian identity. Throughout this historic engagement, Redan Battery played a pivotal role in
the action for both American invaders and for British defenders and their allies. In 1975, Parks Canada
archaeologist Elizabeth Snow excavated the battery to record the structural layout for restoration of the gun
emplacement. Reviewing Snow’s archaeological site collection in preparation for the 200th anniversary of the
battle, yielded unanticipated evidence of Brock’s fateful day, 13 October 1812.
La bataille de Queenston Heights aura été le premier geste militaire posé la première année de la
Guerre de 1812. Cette victoire consolidera les sympathies des Loyalistes de la région de Niagara à la cause
Britannique et inspirera des unités de milice à s’opposer à l’invasion du Haut-Canada par les Américains.
Quand le Major Général Isaac Brock est mort au combat alors qu’il menait une charge désespérée sur la batterie Redan, il est devenu un héros exemplaire pour les Canadiens. Encore aujourd’hui, le monument érigé en
l’honneur de Brock occupe une place imposante dans le paysage, reflétant le lien entre la bataille de
Queenston Heights et le moment où est né un sentiment d’identité Canadienne. Tout au long de cet engagement historique, la batterie Redan jouera un rôle central pour les envahisseurs Américains et les Défendeurs
Britanniques de même que leurs alliés. En 1975, l’archéologue de Parcs Canada Elizabeth Snow a effectué des
fouilles sur la batterie et a documenté sa configuration structurale en vue de la restauration de l’emplacement
du canon. C’est en revoyant la collection archéologique pour le 200ième anniversaire de la bataille que des
informations inattendues à propos de ce jour fatidique du 13 octobre 1812 ont été dévoilées.

Introduction

On 18 June 1812, President Madison signed
the Declaration of War against Britain. American
public opinion, enraged by accusations of the
Royal Navy’s disregard for U.S. sovereignty in
relentlessly boarding American ships and
impressing American seamen and British
deserters, goaded its politicians into action. Since
1807, America had endured the consequences
of the British Orders in Council permitting the
British navy to seize, on the open sea, any ship
sailing a course for Napoleonic ports. This
legislation devastated the western and
southern U.S. export trade and caused serious
economic hardship (Latimer 2007: 24).
American war-hawk politicians in Kentucky,
Ohio, and the territories also pressured loudly
for war, arguing that British Indian agents
fueled native unrest. Western expansionists
spoke of driving the British out of North
America, subduing native peoples, and
opening the land for settlement. From their
perspective, Canadian settlers’ destiny was
liberation from British oppression (Berton

1980: 25; Taylor 2011: 137). Time for action had
arrived. They would strike against the tyrant in
Upper and Lower Canada while Britain’s attention
remained focused on the Napoleonic Wars.
Major General Henry Dearborn, chosen to
lead the northern campaign, laid out his strategy
roughly based on a plan of attack suggested
earlier by John Armstrong, military counselor
to President Madison. Dearborn proposed a
main thrust against Montreal to cut the St.
Lawrence River supply line. To divide the
attention of British regulars in Canada and to
protect against native attacks on the western
frontier, he also proposed a coordinated,
multipronged invasion, sending U.S. forces,
supported by militia brigades, to cross the
Detroit, Niagara, and upper St. Lawrence
rivers (Malcomson 2003: 29; Turner 2011: 82).
At Quebec, Sir George Prevost, governor in
Chief of British North America, was well
aware of American disaffection with Britain’s
ruthless actions. By December 1811, he
acknowledged the increasingly apparent need to
at least prepare the provinces against attack.
The number of British regulars in the upper
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province was almost doubled from 1808 levels
to 1,150 men and officers. Much needed
military stores began arriving on the frontier
as well, and militia commanders began
reviewing their lists of 11,650 men, aged 16 to
60, eligible for militia service. Still, the over
1,000 mi. (1609 km) border in Upper Canada
alone stretched these few military resources
and, with the ongoing war in Europe,
e x p e c t a t i o n o f f u r t h e r B r i t i s h t ro o p
reinforcements was slim (Latimer 2007: 37–45).
Prevost was determined to hold Quebec at
all costs and retained his major defense force
in Lower Canada. He adopted, and strongly
insisted upon, a cautious nonaggression
policy, hoping diplomacy would prevail over
military action until Britain could turn its
attention back to British North America
(Taylor 2011: 150; Turner 2011: 103).
Perhaps Prevost’s most fortuitous choice
was to appoint Isaac Brock to act as civil
administrator for the province of Upper Canada
(fig. 1). Brock had arrived in Canada in 1802
with the 49th Regiment. He rose rapidly
through the ranks in the ten years prior to the
war. Made a colonel in 1805, Brock had
opportunity to command at various posts in
Upper and Lower Canada and by 1807, as
brigadier general, he had acted as commander
in chief of forces. Soldiers respected and liked
Brock, and his experience made him a familiar
figure in civil society (Malcomson 2003: 34–37).
Hamstrung by Prevost’s nonaggression
policy and the limited number of regulars at
his disposal in Upper Canada, Brock had to
make do with those resources available to him.
In the early months of 1812, he made changes
to the Militia Act, calling out volunteer flank
companies in each militia regiment for
training. The move proved popular, and the
roster of volunteers swelled. In Loyalist Niagara,
response was particularly enthusiastic, with
five flank companies quickly filled and
enough remaining to form the Niagara Light
Dragoons, militia artillery, and a car brigade of
artillery drivers (Malcomson 2003: 48). The local
enthusiasm impressed Brock, but he remained
doubtful of the militia’s determination to
stand loyal against a seemingly overwhelming
enemy force.
Brock also courted support from aboriginal
peoples in both Upper Canada and in the
territories of the western Great Lakes. The terror

that native warriors inspired in any enemy
made a military alliance more significant than
the number of warriors they supplied. Certainly,
Brock wanted natives allied to the British rather
than against them. Although the Six Nations
Mohawk, led by John Norton, preferred to remain
neutral at this point, Brock strongly advocated
preemptive strikes against Mackinac and
Detroit to seal an alliance with Tecumseh and
his northern confederacy. The U.S. infantry and
militia strike at the November 1811 Battle of
Tippecanoe had infuriated the tribes, who now
swore vengeance against land-hungry Americans
(Berton 1980: 69–77; Turner 2011: 60).
Prevost’s policy, prohibiting action that
might incite war, tied Brock’s hands. Despite
this, Brock anticipated likely border invasion
points and parleyed with potential allies. His
confidential correspondence with Robert
Dickenson, an influential fur trader residing
among the northwestern native bands,
negotiated an alliance with the British. Months
before the official war declaration, the warriors

Figure 1. Portrait of Sir Isaac Brock, by John Wycliffe
Lowes Forster (ca. 1875). (Image courtesy of Library
and Archives Canada, e010767950).
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and Dickenson departed for the British post at
Fort St. Joseph to await attack on the American
outpost of Mackinac (Turner 2011: 95).
News of the declaration of war traveled
quickly to the Canadian frontier via fur trade
correspondence. Word reached Fort St. Joseph
on 3 July, five days before a dispatch from
Brock reached Captain Roberts, commanding
officer at that frontier post. Brock merely
alerted him of the beginning of hostilities.
Four days later, another message arrived from
Brock advising Roberts of Prevost’s instruction
to take no aggressive action, hoping the Americans
would not act unless provoked. A week later,
Brock again wrote Captain Roberts, telling him
to “adopt the most prudent measures either of
offense or defense which circumstance might
point out” (Berton 1980: 109; Turner 2011: 113).
With natives at his post restless for action,
Roberts interpreted Brock’s instruction as
permission to move against Mackinac ( fig .
2A). The next day, 16 July, he set off with his
small force of regulars reinforced by Dickenson’s
nearly 300 tribesmen and a force of 180 volunteer
voyageurs. They arrived at Mackinac before
dawn and, with assistance from a local
American fur trader, negotiated the complete
capitulation of Fort Mackinac without a shot
fired. Indeed, the fort captors informed
Lieutenant Hanks, commanding officer at
Mackinac, that war had commenced. He had
received no news of the commencement of
hostilities from his superiors (Taylor 2011: 153).
Fortunately for Brock and Roberts, Prevost
could not construe this invasion of American
territory as a flash point to war as, four days
prior, Brigadier General William Hull had
crossed the Detroit River and placidly seized
the village of Sandwich on the British shore
(fig. 2B). From there, Hull issued a proclamation
pressuring local settlers to remain neutral. He
threatened severe consequences for anyone
fighting on the side of the British and their
native allies (Turner 2011: 115). The proclamation
had considerable effect; over half the
untrained militia deserted its posts. However,
Hull had difficulty in retaining his long and
vulnerable supply line and needed to provision
his army. American raiding parties scoured the
countryside, seizing farmers’ harvests and
livestock, and burning and destroying crops
and property. These acts turned local sentiment
against the promised ideals of American

liberty (Berton 1980: 136; Taylor 2011: 161).
Discontent grew as Hull delayed at Sandwich
awaiting artillery support before he would
advance on the British fort at Amherstburg.
Learning of the fall of Mackinac and advised
that British reinforcements had arrived at
Amherstburg, General Hull retreated across
the river to Detroit, much to the consternation
of his officers (Turner 2011: 123).
Meanwhile, Isaac Brock arrived at
Amherstburg with a small force of regulars and
loyal militia from Niagara. He called a council
of his officers and, despite their reservations,
he ordered them to support his plan to invade
Detroit straightaway. He addressed the allied
native tribes and met with Tecumseh and the
older chiefs to explain his strategy. Brock also
issued a general order to the local populace
and militia cowed by Hull’s proclamation. In it
he expressed his surprise at the number of
local militia desertions, but suggested the
cause was more likely anxiety to harvest crops,
rather than any “predilection for the principles
or government of the United States” (Berton
1980: 167). His cleverly phrased amnesty
allowed the deserters to save face and united
the local populace behind the British.
With militia, native allies, and regulars,
Brock led about 1,300 men. Hull at Detroit
commanded more than 2,000. Boldly, Brock
sent a message to Hull asking for the complete
surrender of Fort Detroit. Hull was uncertain
of the number of British regulars Brock
commanded, for 300 militiamen wore cast-off
41st Regiment uniforms. Brock had also tricked
Hull into believing 5,000 warriors, en route
from Mackinac, would soon arrive to support
the invasion of Detroit (Latimer 2007: 67).
Brock commenced an artillery attack in the
afternoon of 15 August. That evening the native
allies crossed the Detroit River to support the
British landing at dawn. The crossing was
uncontested. Brock took up a position in a
ravine out of firing range and watched as native
warriors looped past Fort Detroit three times,
screeching war cries and waving tomahawks
in full view of the fort garrison. Confused by
the charade, U.S. officers estimated the warriors’
number at three times their actual strength
and believed the Detroit garrison heavily
outnumbered (Taylor 2011: 164) .
Hull witnessed the British artillery attack
taking its gruesome toll within the fort. With
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Figure 2. Early military actions in the first year of the War of 1812 showing (A) allied British forces from Fort St.
Joseph take Mackinac July 17; (B) Hull invades Canada from Detroit taking village of Sandwich on July 12, and
Hull’s surrender and allied British forces take Detroit August 16; (C); Niagara frontier. Detail of the Map of the
Seat of War in North America. John Melish Publisher, Philadelphia. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives
Canada, National Map Collection 6760.)

350 men of the Detroit garrison absent to escort
a supply train, General Hull surrendered,
swayed by fear of a native massacre of both
soldiers and the civilian population sheltered
within the fort (Stagg 2012: 65). His officers
were aghast. For capitulating without a fight,
General Hull would be court martialed.
Acquitted of the charge of treason, the 1814
court martial found him guilty of cowardice
and sentenced Hull to be shot. President
Madison finally pardoned Hull, who remained
certain that he had followed the best course of
action (Berton 1980: 188; Turner 2011: 147). The
collapse of Hull’s army at Detroit enhanced
Brock’s reputation and convinced many Upper

Canadians of the viability of resisting
American invasion. Native tribes settled in the
Grand River area that initially had preferred to
remain neutral now rallied behind the victors.
The Detroit cache of arms and artillery, a
brig, many smaller craft, and the captured
supply train of pack animals, cattle, and
provisions filled the military coffers and
proffered considerable prize money to build
morale among the troops (Berton 1980: 186;
Taylor 2011: 165).
Brock returned triumphant to Niagara, but
there he learned of an armistice signed by
Prevost and Major General Dearborn. The
peace extended to 8 September, and Brock
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feared the Americans only signed to buy time
to reinforce their positions. Across the Niagara
River, he could see a second U.S. army
massing under the command of Major General
Stephen Van Rensselaer. Brock knew an attack
must come soon, but was uncertain where
along the 35 mi. (56 km) stretch of the Niagara
River the invaders would strike ( fig . 2C)
(Malcomson 2003).
Unable to move against the enemy, Brock
prepared his defenses. He gleaned intelligence on
the American forces and sent for reinforcements
under his command in Upper Canada at
Amherstburg and Kingston. He intensified
training and drilling of militia units, issued
strategic orders outlining a signal warning system,
and established fallback positions should
attack occur at various points along the river.
Only a few days before the Battle of
Queenston Heights, Brock still expressed concern
regarding the commitment of the militia to
remain loyal should an invading force gain
possession of the Upper Canadian shore along
the Niagara River. He remarked: “[T]he enemy
would obtain an advantage ... over the feelings
of the militia that might be productive of fatal
consequences if allowed to spread, the disaffected will assume a tone and posture that cannot
fail to operate in deterring the loyal from active
exertion” (Brock 1920: 48). In the battle that
would soon follow, Brock’s suspicion of Niagara
settlers’ loyalty proved largely unfounded.

The Battle of Queenston Heights

Deserters and informants from the American
side kept Brock abreast of conditions of the
enemy force across the river. As fall arrived
with rain and inclement weather, sickness
from want of clothing and shelter ravaged the
U.S. camp. Discontent from lack of pay and
action demoralized militia forces. Moreover,
American command seemed fragmented.
Brigadier General Smyth, at Black Rock near
Buffalo, initially refused to meet or act in concert
with Major General Van Rensselaer at Lewiston
who was planning the attack on Queenston
(Stagg 2012: 71). Acting independently of Van
Rensselaer, Smyth approved a naval plan to
seize two British schooners anchored near Fort
Erie. Seizure of the vessels occurred on the
night of 8 October, with one captured and one
lost. Winfield Scott of the 2nd U.S. Artillery
had just arrived at Black Rock and assisted in

the attack. The success of this action put further
pressure on Van Rensselaer to act. On 10
October he ordered an assault on Queenston
that night, but due to a mishap with the transport
boats, the attack had to be postponed (Berton
1980: 228; Turner 2011: 169).
Warned of the failed mission by Captain
Williams, stationed at Queenston Heights
Cantonment, Brock arrived from Fort George
near noon of the 11th to assess the situation.
From a vantage point on the escarpment, Brock
and his officers surveyed the setting, unaware
that it would become a bloody battleground 34
hours later. At Queenston, the fast-flowing
Niagara River was only 250 yd. (228.6 m)
across. Brock could clearly see Lewiston nestled
above the riverbank, just downstream from
Queenston Village. Williams directed Brock’s
attention to a ravine above Lewiston, where
his sentries had noted an increased concentration
of American troops. As he gauged the scene,
Brock knew the enemy had recently fortified
Fort Gray, a battery on Lewiston Heights. It
boasted two 18-pounders and was situated
upstream of Redan Battery.
Redan Battery stood on a ridge of the
escarpment above Queenston Village and just
below the cantonment on the heights. Named
after the classic V-shape, (two faces forming a
salient angle), it mounted an 18-pounder
cannon and an 8 in. mortar. Below, by the
village landing, stood an old stone blockhouse
with a 9-pounder battery. About 2,000 yd. (1.8
km) downstream, across from Lewiston, stood
Vrooman’s Battery, armed with a 12-pounder
and a 18-pounder cannon. Vrooman’s guns
would be beyond range during the engagement
(Malcomson 2003: 123; Latimer 2007: 74).
Anticipating an attack soon, Brock returned
to his Niagara headquarters at Government
House, where he activated all available militia
units. The next day he sent one of his senior
officers, Major Evans, across the river to
Lewiston to negotiate an exchange of prisoners
taken during the action with Major General
Van Rensselaer at Black Rock. Evans crossed at
Queenston, but found his reception unusual.
He reported being delayed at the landing and
was then informed he would not be able to
meet with the general until the next day. While
waiting, Evans noted militia from Kentucky,
Ohio, and Tennessee had strengthened the
American forces. He also spied a line of bateaux
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covered by brush on the shore (Malcomson
1970: 125). Expecting imminent attack, Evans
returned to alert troops at Queenston to be
vigilant, then rode to inform Brock of an
impending invasion. Brock warned his officers
and sent messages to militia commanders to
prepare their men (Turner 2011: 172).
At Lewiston, Van Rensselaer felt pressure
to act from his officers and ordered a second
attempt on Queenston for before dawn of 13
October. This left many of his supporting
regiments, drenched and exhausted from the
previous attempt, no time to recover. The
American force also lacked sufficient supplies
and ammunition, while the 13 available
bateaux provided scant space to move an
invading force, let alone artillery, across the
Niagara River. Regardless, at 4 AM the first
wave of about 300 invaders pushed off from
the American embarkation point just south of
Lewiston and touched the Canadian shore at a
point 500 yd. (457 m) upstream of Queenston
landing (fig. 3A). In the dark, a British guard
on the bank fired into the boats, killing and
wounding several men, then fled to raise the
alarm (Malcomson 2003: 131–133).
Captain Dennis of the 49th Regiment,
supported by militia, fired on the invaders, but
after a fierce musketry battle the Americans
drove them back into Queenston Village (fig.
3B). There the artillery was directing case shot
against the U.S. embarkation point, causing
havoc amongst the second wave of invaders
awaiting transport. Above, on the heights, the
18-pounder gun at Redan Battery harassed
transport boats crossing the river. Several
American officers, including Lieutenant
Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, Stephen’s
lead military advisor, suffered severe wounds
in the initial exchange of musket fire
(Malcomson 2003: 133–138). The other senior
office in the first wave, Lieutenant Colonel
John Chrystie, did not arrive to take command.
Chrystie’s bateau had returned to the American
shore after it drifted downstream and came
under fire from the British near Hamilton Cove
at the north end of Queenston Village.
This tenuous situation left Solomon Van
Rensselaer no option but to trust junior officers
to carry the invasion forward until reinforcements
could arrive. He ordered Captain John Wool
and Captain Ogilvie of the 13th U.S. Infantry
to lead a detachment of about 160 men and,

following Lieutenant Gansevoort, who was
somewhat familiar with the terrain, storm Redan
Battery on the heights (Malcomson 2003: 142).
By this time, Brock, aroused from his sleep
at Government House in Niagara, had ridden
to Queenston to reconnoiter the situation. The
American 18-pounders at Fort Grey had
silenced the Queenston Village 9-pounder.
This relieved the American embarkation point,
and a new wave of invaders, led by Lieutenant
Colonel Fenwick, set out in five bateaux that
had returned from the Canadian shore.
Piloting themselves across, the strong current
caught and carried them downstream to
approach the shore at Hamilton Cove. Either
Brock or Captain Dennis ordered Captain
Williams light company down from Queenston
Heights to address this new menace to the
village. Fenwick’s force was cut to shreds,
with many captured, wounded, or killed in the
action (fig. 3C). Meanwhile, with no guard left
on the heights above, Wool’s force attained the
summit without being perceived and charged
down on the Redan Battery from the rear.
Surprised and overwhelmed, the British gunners
fled, and Americans colors unfurled at the gun
position (Malcomson 2003: 148–152).
Brock’s own District General Order No. 7,
prepared in early August, clearly stated that
batteries should be defended “to the last
extremity, but, in the event of any one being
completely overpowered, the men defending
such battery will fall back in a cool, regular
manner” (Brock 1920: 19). Left unguarded
when Brock or Dennis ordered Williams’s men
down from Queenston Heights, Redan Battery
was clearly not defended to the last extremity,
and the gun crew’s retreat was probably neither
cool nor regular.
A somewhat dubious account suggests Brock
was at Redan Battery when it was overpowered.
This version records that the gun crew barely
managed to spike the cannon touchhole with a
ramrod before retreating (Berton 1980: 239).
Another account implies the gunners did not
spike the vent before fleeing (Malcomson 2003:
156; Latimer 2007: 80).
Brock’s immediate and impulsive attempt
to retake the battery attests to the strategic
importance of this high ground. In the immediate
situation, had the Americans turned the gun
on Queenston Village defenses, American
reinforcements could have crossed the Niagara
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unimpeded. Moreover, a consolidated American
force on Queenston Heights would divide
British forces and cut the supply line along the
Portage Road. Without knowledge of the
strength of the force at the battery, he acted
immediately to right the situation.
Brock gathered a small force of about 50
men, including part of the 49th Regiment
Light Company and members of the Lincoln
and York militias, and led them in a desperate
frontal counterattack on Redan Battery. Leading
his force on foot up the slope, he presented an
obvious target to an American infantryman
who took aim and fatally shot him. Brock’s
men carried his body back to the village,
where they concealed it (fig. 3D). Although the
attack continued, the outnumbered defenders
soon retreated, some to the village, while
others followed Captain Williams to the west
along the escarpment above the battery.
As British reinforcements arrived at
Queenston, including Brock’s aide-de-camp,
Lieutenant Colonel John Macdonell, they
joined Williams on the heights. With about 80
men, they advanced down on Wool’s ensconced
force. The British advance was strong enough
to drive the invaders to the edge of the cliff

(fig. 3E). Here, the contradictory account of the
spiking of the gun relates that an American
spiked the 18-pounder during this second
counteroffensive, when it appeared they would
lose the position (Malcomson 2003: 156; Latimer
2007: 80). Just as success appeared in their
grasp, Macdonell fell mortally wounded, and
Williams dropped, briefly knocked unconscious.
The British offensive collapsed with some men
captured and the remainder retreating to
Queenston or west to the village of St. Davids.
As U.S. reinforcements arrived, Wool ordered
the gun drilled, but the invaders lost crucial
time before it could be readied for service.
The defenders fell back from Queenston
Village, leaving Brock’s body hidden in a
house. This left American forces a few hours to
consolidate and reinforce their position with
no opposition. U.S. regulars, along with about
a quarter of the militia, eagerly crossed the
river to take up positions. They shipped a
6-pounder fieldpiece and accoutrements across
the river and hauled it up the heights. As boats
crossed with reinforcements, they returned
carrying American dead and wounded within
sight of the militiamen awaiting transport
(Malcomson 2003: 164; Stagg 2012: 71).

Figure 3. The entire battle of Queenston Heights showing: (A) American invasion point above Queenston
Village; (B) fierce musketry battle with the British driven back into Queenston; (C) Fenwick’s force floats downstream and are defeated at Hamilton Cove; (D) Brock leads a charge to retake Redan Battery and is killed; (E)
Macdonell and Williams attempt to retake the battery; (F) American militia stand firm on American soil; (G)
Sheaffe’s advance and the American retreat down the cliff. Detail of an oil painting by an unknown artist based
on Major Dennis’s drawing of the battle, ca. 1815. (Courtesy of Riverbrink Museum, Queenston, Ontario 982.2).
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As morning passed, the British 41st Light
Company reoccupied Queenston Village,
allowing the artillery commander from Fort
George to establish gun positions. Once again,
British guns began harassing any bateaux
attempting to cross the river. About this same
time, on the heights, Norton and the Grand
River warriors advanced on the defensive
lines established by Winfield Scott, who had
arrived and taken command from the lessexperienced militia commander William
Wadsworth. Scott was successful in repelling
the initial attack, but the warriors continued to
fire on the American line. With the sounds of
gunshot and war cries echoing across the river,
nothing could now induce the militia to leave
the safety of America soil for the invasion of a
foreign shore. Of more than 3,000 militia
present, only about 700 crossed in the assault
(fig. 3F) (Malcomson 2003: 165).
By early afternoon, British forces, reinforced
by troops and militia from strong points along
the Niagara, assembled and moved toward
Queenston Heights. Around 3 PM the combined
British force of 900 regulars, militia, and native
allies, led by Major General Sheaffe, Brock’s
second in command, advanced with field
artillery and fired a volley at the American
line. The U.S. force had now shrunk to about
400, as men slipped away to hide below the
cliff face. Those remaining fired a volley in
return, then fell back in retreat, at first in an
orderly fashion and then in frantic leaps down
the cliff (fig. 3G). With no bateaux to effect an
escape, some plunged into the fast-flowing
river and drowned, or were shot while
attempting to reach the far shore. Americans
hoisted a surrender flag, but it went unnoticed
until around 4 PM, when a repeated bugle call
halted the fighting (Malcomson 2003: 181–191).
British officers met to exchange congratulations
at the battery, where Sheaffe received Brigadier
General William Wadsworth’s sword, signifying
the American surrender (Cruickshank 1902a: 7).
Accounts of American dead and wounded
from the battle vary widely, from 160 casualties
to 500 killed and drowned alone. The British
clearly documented the number of American
prisoners taken for later prisoner exchange:
436 regulars and 489 militia, 925 in total. British
regulars, militia, and native allies sustained losses
of 25 killed, 85 wounded and 22 captured,
with an unknown figure of native wounded
not tallied. The loss of Brock and his aide-de-

camp Macdonell was deeply grieved. They lay
in state at Government House in Niagara until
October 16. A long and formal procession
followed their coffins to graves dug in a bastion
at Fort George, while American cannon fired a
courtesy salute to the British commander from
Fort Niagara (Malcomson 2003: 193–197).

Excavation of the Redan Battery Structural
Layout and Building Hardware

The Battle of Queenston Heights played a
decisive role in the first year of the War of
1812. Inspired by their allied role in this victory
and by the example of Isaac Brock, most
Niagara settlers rallied behind the British
cause and committed themselves to defending
their homes against American invasion. Militia
veterans, native allies, and their descendants
celebrated their role in the defense and marked
important battle places with monuments
memorializing the triumph and its heroes.
Indeed, Alexander Muir’s 1867 lyrics of “The
Maple Leaf Forever,” praising the defenders at
Queenston, became an unofficial anthem sung
by Ontario schoolchildren well into the next
century. The central role of Redan Battery in
this historic event ensured it would be a focal
point in the commemoration of the Battle of
Queenston Heights.
In the mid-20th century, the battery was a
station in a walking trail designed for tourists
to highlight the course of the battle. In 1975,
Parks Canada proposed an upgrade to replace
the then-current abstract marker with a more
historically accurate one. With consent of the
Niagara Parks Commission, which owned the
property, Parks conducted research on the
position and acquired an 18-pounder cannon
for Redan Battery (Haldorson 1975).
Prior to reconstruction, archaeologist
Elizabeth Snow of Parks Canada excavated and
recorded the battery site (fig. 4). Her 1975 report,
“Salvage Archaeology at the Redan Battery,
Queenston Heights”, details the structural
layout of the gun position. Snow excavated the
trace of the stone-revetted interior faces of the
earth embankments and projected the configuration of the 18-pounder cannon emplacement
platform based on pine sleeper remnants
resting on a clay and gravel base (fig. 5).
Snow noted that all artifact material lay
outside the platform footprint. The platform
created a shadow effect, with artifact deposition
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Figure 4. Excavation recording at Redan Battery (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

found at the perimeter of the clay and gravel
leveling fill. This fill defined the platform
extent in areas where sleepers had been
removed (Snow 1975: 13). Excavated bent and
broken wrought spikes, and the lack of any
trace of decking planks suggest the military
dismantled the gun platform for salvage of
reusable materials sometime after the war.
Considering a number of wrought 2.75 in.
(7 cm) to 3 in. (8 cm) nails, too small for use in
a gun platform, Snow surmised the presence
of another structure at the battery; possibly a
field magazine (Snow 1975: 8). A quantity of

wrought, 1.5 in. (3.5 to 4 cm) shingle/lathe
nails in the assemblage, an excavated, large
wrought-iron key, and a latch bar guide lend
support to the presence of a subsidiary
structure. Snow actually found the key
secreted between the stones in the revetted
battery wall, “obviously shoved into the crack
for safe-keeping” (Snow 1975: 16). The hidden
locale suggests the key unlocked the door of a
nearby structure, possibly the expense
magazine or, perhaps, a limber padlock (fig. 6).
Parks Canada historians recovered an 1818
plan of the Position of Queenston, by Captain

Northeast Historical Archaeology/Vol. 44, 2015 69

Figure 5. Compilation of Figures 1 to 3 of Elizabeth Snow’s (1975) report showing: (A) projected configuration of
the cannon platform, (B) excavation unit plan and features. (C) shows the remains of a platform sleeper supported
on a stone slab in unit 22H2A. (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

Figure 6. Broken spikes from dismantling the cannon platform on left, nails too small for use in the platform on
upper right and the wrought iron key found in a crack between the stones of the revetment. (Photo by author, 2013.)
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Figure 7. Detail of an 1818 plan of Queenston showing the crescent-shaped Redan Battery with a small building
at the back and the post-battle Barrack and Fuel yard on the ridge above. Plan by Captain Vavasour, Royal
Engineer. (Image courtesy of Library and Archives Canada, National Map Collection 22750.)

Vavasour of the Royal Engineers, after Snow
completed her report. The plan shows a small
structure immediately behind the crescent
shape of the battery (fig. 7). A barrack and two
structures, possibly a stable and privy, appear
above the battery at the top of a path leading
past a fuel yard. These structures, located in
the current roadway lookout, decidedly postdate
the Battle of Queenston Heights.
Brock’s general orders, dated 8 October,
five days before the U.S. invasion, direct
“Captain Williams, of the 49th Regiment, with
the light company under his command, will

march from Chippawa to-morrow morning at
daylight for the camp at Queenston” (Brock
1920: 31). That Williams’s men were encamped
on the heights implies that the barrack shown
on the 1818 plan postdates the action. Another
1812 account also notes 90 grenadiers of the
49th Regiment housed in the stone barrack at
Queenston Landing on the river shore below
on the eve of the battle (Malcomson 2003: 123).
The small structure behind Redan Battery
(possibly indicating a traverse or an expense
magazine to service the 18-pounder gun at this
isolated position) may have been built when
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the emplacement was first constructed or may
also have been a post-battle addition.
The Queenston Battery was one of the new
positions Brock noted as recently completed in
his July 1812 correspondence with Prevost.
Brock described the battery as “strong, built of
stone and will probably mount two or three
pieces” (Malcomson 2003: 55). He does not
mention a magazine, although the omission
does not entirely discount its presence at that
time. Still, at the time of the battle, munitions
may simply have been stored in limbers
behind the platform.
Snow’s 1975 excavation affirmed the
strength of the stone battery, but as her project
focus was confined to establishing the line of
the north and east faces, she did not test
beyond that area. She did note a crescentshaped earthen berm “oriented in the same
direction as the Redan Battery itself,” but did
not test the feature (Snow 1975: 8). This mound,
recorded on a 2011 plan, may represent a traverse
to protect munition limbers, or a magazine
sited near the base of the ridge to the southeast.
It may also be a later site alteration (fig. 8).
Lossing’s 19th-century accounts of the War of
1812 note that “we passed a burying-ground
which marks the site of the redan battery”
(Lossing 1869: 413). The mound might relate to
burials or to a later, 20th-century disturbance.
1812-Era Insignia
Aside from recording the battery features
and associated structural artifacts, Snow reported
the recovery of 1812-era military insignia,
munitions, food-related glass and ceramics,
and miscellaneous artifacts. The presence of
fragments of human bone, recently identified
among her excavated faunal material (Berg
2012), is a somber reminder of the carnage of
war and of the sacred nature of battlegrounds.
Perhaps the most evocative War of 1812–era
artifact is a distorted, 41st Regiment uniform
button. Along with his own 49th Regiment, Brock
relied heavily on the steadiness of the veteran
41st soldiers and assigned its noncommissioned
officers the role of instructing inexperienced
men of the militia units (Brock 1920: 39). In the
summer and fall of 1812, Brock had detachments
of the 41st Regiment spread along the Niagara
River within four established divisions: First
Division, Fort Erie and dependencies; Second
Division, Chippawa and dependencies; Third

Division, Queenston; and Fourth Division, Fort
George and dependencies (fig. 9).
During the Queenston engagement, the
main body of the 41st Regiment served in the
Second and Fourth Divisions, at Chippawa,
Millers, and Navy Island, and at Fort George,
respectively. Officers’ returns of casualties note,
however: “Private Thomas Haynes 41st Regt. ...
was kill’d in the Battery” (Smith 1812: 115).
Day orders and accounts indicate Haynes was
part of a detail of 10 members of the 41st
employed in the service of the royal engineer at
Queenston. The face of the coat closure button
from a 41st Regiment uniform is concave as
though hit by shot, and the button shank is
heavily encrusted (fig. 10A).
Haynes was the only specific member of
the 41st known to have been killed at Redan
Battery. The dislodged button might well signal
Haynes final moment, although the regimental
return of killed and wounded during the action
records Haynes’s shared his fate with Sergeant
Merryweather and David Jones, both of whom
died of wounds through the body during the
engagement. Nine other soldiers of the 41st
received various nonfatal wounds to the
abdomen, head, thigh, and leg during the action
(Smith 1812: 125). For their part at Queenston
Heights, both the 41st Foot and 49th Regiments
received battle honors, adding “Queenstown”
to their colors (Malcomson 2003: 213).
On the day of the attack, Captain James
Dennis of the 49th Regiment commanded
Queenston Division. His troops incorporated
184 men of the 49th Regiment, six Royal
Artillery, plus the 10 members of the 41st.
Completing the Queenston Division were 200
militia, comprised of the 5th Lincoln Militia,
the Lincoln Artillery, and the 2nd York Militia
(Malcomson 2003: 272).
An unmarked, pewter button of late 18thearly 19th-century vintage recovered at the battery is likely associated with militia clothing
(fig. 10B). Militia on both the British and U.S.
sides often wore unmarked uniform buttons or
civilian clothing. In the case of Private Thomas
Smith of the 3rd York Militia, rushing to battle
in unmarked civilian clothes had fatal consequences. In the heat of Sheaffe’s counteroffensive,
Norton’s warriors mistook him for an American
militiaman and struck him down on Queenston
Heights before his comrades could intervene
(Malcomson 2003: 189). In the smoke and
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Figure 8. Recent plan of the battery site showing an unidentified berm south of the platform. (Plan by author,
2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

Figure 9. Benjamin Lossing’s Map of the Niagara Frontier highlighting Brock’s four army divisions in Niagara on the eve of the Battle of Queenston Heights; First
Division Fort Erie, Second.Division Chippawa, Third Division Queenston and Fourth Division Fort George. (Lossing 1869: 382.).
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confusion of battle, a uniform, even if only an
arm band, symbolized allegiance and served
the vital role of distinguishing friend from foe.
A 1st Regiment, Royal Scots coat button was
also recovered at the Redan Battery (fig. 10C).
The Royal Scots did not arrive on the Niagara
frontier until 1813, but participated in later
engagements with distinction. The regiment
won the battle honor “Niagara” for exemplary
service in the battles of Chippawa, Lundy’s
Lane, and at Fort Erie (Parkyn 1987: 69).
During their tenure at Niagara, the Queenston
and Redan batteries moved back and forth
between American and British hands several
times, with the Royal Scots garrisoning Redan
Battery intermittently during this period
(Cruickshank 1908). Ironically, an American
account notes that on the first anniversary of
the battle of Queenston Heights, with the British
withdrawn to Burlington, “a small American
militia force took possession of the ground
without opposition” (Cruickshank 1907: 47).
1812-Era Munitions
The military ammunition Snow retrieved
during the battery excavation included two
canister shot and two musket balls. Canister
shot, consisting of a tin canister filled with
cast-iron balls (or sand shot), is an antipersonnel
device employed by ordnance firing at close

range (McConnell 1988: 319). After exiting the
gun muzzle, the canister disintegrates, releasing
a rapidly expanding cone of shot. Canister
wreaks havoc among/against massed troops,
but is only effective at close range, losing force
beyond 300 yd. (274 m).
The small size of the two shot (0.88 and
1.11 in. diameter, or approximately 1½ and 2
oz., respectively) implies use in a 3-pounder to
6-pounder garrison-gun canister or a 3- to 12pounder field-gun canister (fig. 11) (McConnell
1988: 502). The 18-pounder Redan Battery
garrison gun would have loaded canister
packed with 62, 4 oz. shot or 82, 3 oz. shot, both
appreciably larger than the examples recovered.
Though it was fired against American
troops embarked on the river, U.S. forces may
never have employed the captured Redan gun
against the British. Regardless of whether the
British gun crew spiked it before retreating, or
if an American put it out of commission
during Macdonell and William’s counteroffensive, Wool did not order his men to drill the
gun and bring it to bear on the village until
after the second attempt to retake the battery.
Wool then retired to the American shore to
have his wounds tended as Chrystie arrived to
take command (Cruickshank 1902a: 155).
Drilling a vent hole is time consuming. As no
mention is made of U.S. fire on the village
from the battery, they may not have completed

Figure 10. Military buttons recovered at Redan Battery include; (A) 41st Regiment soldier’s coat button struck concave,
(B) unmarked pewter button typical of that worn by militia on both sides of the engagement; and (C) 1st Regiment
Royal Scots coat button. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada)
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the task before the British counteroffensive
that afternoon.
As the invaders watched Sheaffe’s force
approach, John Lovett of the U.S. Artillery
rode to Fort Gray on the American shore
opposite Queenston. Hoping to fire on the
British column 500 yd. away, he ordered his
18-pounder guns loaded with grape- and solid
shot. Before they came into range, however,
the British passed behind the cliff, thwarting
his attempt to provide artillery support to
isolated U.S. forces on the heights. Lovett
watched helplessly as both sides opened with
“fixed cannon, flying artillery and the roll of
musketry.” He recounted: “The mountain
seemed to shake beneath the stride of death”
(Cruickshank 1902a: 87).
British forces advanced with two, 3-pounder
field guns. As they forced the invaders back to
the cliff edge, they encountered the American
6-pounder field gun that had been transported
across the river and hauled up the heights that
morning. In the smoke of battle, it stood abandoned with all its accoutrements and ammunition
wagon containing 4 rounds of fixed shot and 14
rounds of canister (Cruickshank 1902a: 75).
U.S. artillery munitions conformed to the
British caliber system of 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-, and
18-pounder guns (Graves 1984: x). Either the

American 6-pounder or the British 3-pounder
field guns could fire the size of the canister
shot found by Snow. However, the battle
action and in situ War of 1812–context imply
that they issued from a British muzzle as
Sheaffe’s force advanced on the American
position at Redan Battery.
Musket balls retrieved during the excavation
represent both sides of the engagement (fig.
12). One is a .75-caliber British ball, the other a
.69-caliber American ball for the French caliber
muskets carried by American forces. U.S.
cartridges contained either buckshot or a ball
surmounted by three buckshot.
The return of captured American long arms
at Queenston included 435 French carbine
muskets, 380 bayonets, 141 bayonet scabbards,
325 ammunition pouches, and a cache of nearly
6,000 musket cartridges, nearly half with ball and
buckshot, and the remainder with buckshot only
(Cruickshank 1902a: 75). Eyewitness accounts
of the height of battle describe a hail of bullets.
Lieutenant Ridout of the 3rd York Militia wrote:
“[T]he discharge of small arms, the whizzing of
the balls and yells that issued from all quarters,
exceed description” (Malcomson 2003: 189).
An eerie association exists between the
U.S. ball shot recovered at the battery and the

Figure 11. Cast iron canister shot of 2 and 1 ½ ounce gauge. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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Figure 12. Lead British .75 caliber shot and U.S. .69 caliber shot from buck and ball cartridge. (Photo by author,
2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)

Figure 13. U.S. .69 caliber shot exactly fits the contorted face of the 41st Regiment button. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy
of Parks Canada.)
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distorted 41st Regiment button (fig.
13). Excavators found both button and
ball in the same context. After
conservation treatment, a clearly
delineated facet on the shot surface
matched the indentation in the
contorted button face. The effect of
forceful impact shaping these two
objects must have been transmitted to
the soldier who wore the 41st
Regiment uniform, very probably
Private Thomas Haynes, who died at
the battery as Wool’s force swept
down on the gun crew.
1812-Era Human Remains

Human remains identified during
2012 faunal analysis include two
fragments from a left tibia (probably
from the same bone), and two fragments
of fibula, one from near the distal end
of a left fibula and the other from the
proximal end of a right fibula (fig. 14).
They probably represent one individual
(Berg 2012: 2), but confirmation would
require DNA analysis. All the lowerleg bones came from excavation unit
22H2A, an area previously disturbed
by installation of the Parks Canada
trail monument and Niagara Parks
Commission survey marker. Given
the battlefield context, it is likely the
bones represent shattering of limbs in
action with further breakage by surface
trampling. Disturbance of a shallow
burial is a possibility, though lack of
other skeletal elements argues against
this. Still, Snow did note a possible stone
feature disturbed by 20th-century
intrusions, and Lossing’s account does
mention burials marking the location
of the battery (Lossing 1869: 413;
Snow 1975: 13).
Whether the four fragments of
human bone found among the battery
debris represent a British regular, native
warrior, local militia, an American
casualty, or several individuals
remains unknown. The battlefield
context supports the assumption that
the leg bones represent casualties,
and horrific carnage on War of 1812
sites is well-documented (Litt,
Williamson, and Whitehorne 1993).

Figure 14. Human leg bones recovered at Redan Battery include
fragments of left and right fibula and two fragments of tibia
ranging in length from 4.7cm to 6.7cm. (Photo by author, 2012;
courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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Accounts of the Battle of Queenston Heights
aftermath tell of the dead lying on the battlefield
overnight. The next day, when General Van
Rensselaer wrote to request the return of the
American dead to their shore, he learned the
British had already interred the remains at
Queenston. At dawn, a detail of soldiers of the
49th had collected bodies for burial and grimly
reported many stripped of clothing and equipment, and some scalped. In the grisly setting,
one might easily overlook small fragments of
humanity trampled among the battlefield
debris. An American rifleman who survived
the ordeal expressed the feelings of many of his
comrades when he wrote: “Thanks be to God, that
my bones are not now bleaching on the awful
Heights of Queenston” (Malcomson 2003: 195).

sherds represent only one painted pearlware
tea vessel and a creamware plate. A fragment
of a lead-glass tumbler base is the only other
formal 1812-vintage tableware recovered (fig.
15A). Men may have received their rations at
the cantonment on the heights above, although
the presence of faunal debris suggests men
posted at the battery ate there. Tinware may
have been more common than ceramics at this
posting. Snow did recover two fragments of a
large, early 19th-century tin pan with a rolledwire rim typical of the 1812 era (fig. 15B). She
also recovered an nondiagnostic base fragment
of a cast-iron pot or kettle. Prepared rations
may have been carried in these containers to
men on duty.

1812-Era Food-Preparation/Service Material

A fragment of a brass jaw harp and a few
nondescript white-clay pipe-stem fragments
hint at less-eventful moments during military

Domestic artifacts are exceedingly sparse
in the battery assemblage. Five small ceramic

1812-Era Miscellaneous Material

Figure 15. Domestic debris recovered at the battery includes; (A) a few fragments of pearlware and creamware
ceramics and a lead glass tumbler base; (B) large tin pan; (C) undiagnostic pipe stem fragments and a portion of
the bow of a jaw harp frame shown with a complete example; and (D) a fragment of a small chisel and a tool
tang fragment. (Photo by author, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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service at Redan Battery (fig. 15C). Finally, two
wrought-iron artifacts, originally identified by
Snow as spikes, are tools. One is a small firmer
chisel and the other an unidentified tool-handle
tang (fig. 15D).
1812-Era Faunal Assemblage
Snow retrieved an assemblage of food-related
bone, accounting for over a third of the Redan
Battery assemblage. The presence of the faunal
debris implies that men on duty ate at the
emplacement. Once the military built barracks
on the ridge above, men may have received
their rations there, hence the bone debris is
likely associated with the war era.
Faunal analysts interpreting British military
contexts have built upon the seminal work of
Wilson and Southwood (1976) at Fort George.
Questions raised by Wilson about identifying
the source of meat, and, in particular, the issue
of fresh- vs. salt-meat provisions, found potential
answers in Burns’s (1983) listing of statutes from
Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritime
Legislatures. These rules on bulk packaging
date from 1758 to 1867 and describe the type of
barrel, inspection requirements, labeling, and
content quality for various grades of produce.
The 1805 statute from Upper Canada and the
similar 1804 statute for Lower Canada are
frequently cited for War of 1812 faunal studies
(Berg 2010, 2012; Rick 1993).

Quality levels for pickled beef specify
animals aged three years or more, and divide
the 12 to 4 lb. portion requirement into “mess
beef,” “prime beef,” and “cargo beef.” Graduated
amounts of less desirable portions, such as the
neck, appear in descending grade order. No
heads or hocks are to be included in any grade
of salt beef. Pickled pork is also divided into
mess, prime, and cargo pork. Prime includes
only ribs of “good fat hogs” of 100 lb. or more,
while cargo allows for “not more than two
heads weighing a maximum of 25 lb. with ears
snout brain and bloody grizzle removed.” No
grade of pork allowed legs. The long list of
commodities transported in barrels does not
include mutton, which was not suitable for
salting (Burns 1983: 4–7; Rick 1993: 32).
In the battery assemblage, over half the 162
food-related bones could be cross-mended, with
their breakage largely attributed to trampling
after discard. One third exhibited cleaver or ax
marks from processing, with no saw or knifecut marks (Berg 2012: 4).
Combinations of sawn and chopped
processing are often characteristic of British
military rations. The commissary often purchased fresh and barreled meat sawn into
quarters by suppliers. Quartermasters reduced
meat further by chopping into mess issue for
about 12 men, while splitting into rations (of
approximately 1 lb. of meat per man) with
further cutting for stewing resulted in smaller

Figure 16. Food-related faunal material recovered from Redan Battery includes; (A) beef leg and rib bone, (B) sheep/
goat, (C) young pig scapula, and (D) white-tailed deer bone. (Photo by author, 2012; courtesy of Parks Canada.)
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Figure 17. Detail of Queenston Military Reserve showing encroachments by the Erie and Ontario Railway.
Railway shed (No 10) is immediately NW of the no longer extant battery although the Old Barrack (No. 12)
remains intact. Plan by Lt. Colonel Vavasour, Royal Engineers, 26 October 1850. (Image courtesy of Library and
Archives Canada, National Map Collection 4351).

pieces (Wilson and Southwood 1976: 130;
Cumbaa 1979: 19; Berg 2010: 20).
Analysts conclude that animal species, age,
presence/absence of certain portions, and a
combination of sawn and cut processing can
be suggestive of fresh vs. salt meat. Among
identified species found at Redan Battery,
cattle bones are predominant, followed by pig,
then sheep/goat, and one deer (fig. 16). Two of
the cattle fragments are from lower-leg bones
(normally not packed in salt beef), suggesting
the Queenston Division enjoyed at least some
fresh beef. The pig dentary bones in the sample
do not have their anterior ends chopped off, as
would be expected in the removal of the snout
for barrel provision; and a scapula from a piglet
too young for salt preservation also suggests
fresh pork (Berg 2012: 5).

The situation at Niagara was unlike isolated
Fort St. Joseph, where salt pork and peas
dominated the diet. Here fresh meat was easily
accessible from the burgeoning settlements
and via water transport. Seasonality and
wartime necessity would diminish availability
of fresh supply, and quantities of salt pork and
beef are listed among stores captured at Fort
George in 1813 (Wilson and Southwood 1976:
123; Cumbaa 1979: 19).
The sheep/goat in the assemblage is
frequently found in military contexts and
likely represents a local source, while the
white-tailed deer bone suggests hunting or
perhaps purchase of venison. The piglet less
than three months in age may reflect illicit
scavenging of nearby settlers’ livestock, an
activity frequently documented during the
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war. In 1814, General Drummond complained
of the Royal Scots behavior being “more that
of a plundering banditti than of British
soldiers employed for the protection of the
country and its inhabitants” (Cruickshank
1908: 208).

Redan Battery in the Post–War of 1812 Era

As Elizabeth Snow surmised, the lack of
decking and the broken spikes in the
assemblage indicate that the military
dismantled Redan Battery sometime after the
War of 1812. The battery is no longer present
on a detailed 1850 plan of the Queenston
military reserve. Only the old barrack above
the battery location is still extant at midcentury ( fig . 17). Royal Engineer Henry
Vavasour prepared both this plan and the
earlier 1818 map, indicating on both the place
where Brock fell. By 1850, Vavasour was a
lieutenant colonel, having returned to Canada
after a long absence (Woodward 2011).
Vavasour’s second plan locates the original
monument honoring Brock and Macdonell,
whose bodies had been reinterred on Queenston
Heights with all due ceremony on 11 October
1824. A large crowd, including many veterans
of the war, turned out for the occasion. The
monument, a 135 ft. (41.2 m) tall column with
an observation platform at the summit, was
bombed in 1840. Authorities suspected an Irish

Canadian of planting the bomb in revenge for
the death of a relative killed during the 1837
Rebellion in Upper Canada. The act outraged
the community, and a committee began raising
funds by subscription for a new monument.
By 1853, they raised enough money to erect an
even more impressive 185 ft. (56 m) high
monument built west of the old column,
which was then demolished. Again, the battle
anniversary, 13 October, marked the date of
the official ceremony to reinter Brock and
Macdonell. A crowd of 12,000–15,000 attended,
and, once again, patriotic speeches honored
veterans of the battle and of the War of 1812
(fig. 18).
Despite the nearby encroachment on military
reserve lands by the Erie and Ontario Railway
indicated on the 1850 plan, the installation of
interpretive markers, and visitation to the site
by tourists following the course of the battle,
surprisingly little mid-19th- to 20th-century
debris was recovered (Plousos 2012). Following
Snow’s 1975 excavation, Parks Canada removed
the abstract monument and installed the
reconstructed platform and 18-pounder cannon
(fig. 19). Under agreement with the Niagara
Parks Commission (the property owner), staff
of Parks Canada, Niagara National Historic
Sites, maintains the cannon emplacement as a
significant place commemorating the Battle of
Queenston Heights.

Figure 18. Brock Monuments showing (A) the original 1824 monument in an engraved print drawn by W. H.
Bartlett circa 1840 (National Art Gallery No. 39303) and (B) a 20th-century photograph of the 1853 Brock
Monument (Courtesy of the Department of the Interior, Canada, and Library and Archives Canada, PA 048140).
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Figure 19. Redan Battery showing (A) the pre-1975 abstract sculpture marking point 5 of the Queenston walking
tour (Parks Canada). (Photo by Elizabeth Snow, 1975; courtesy of Parks Canada.) (B) is a recent site image
showing the current 18-pounder cannon emplacement. (Photo by Joseph Last, 2011; courtesy of Parks Canada.).

Conclusions

The British success in the first year of the
War of 1812 was, in part, an expression of poor
communication and botched incursions by the
invaders. As the war began, the American
military lacked organization, and political
rivalries between commanders resulted in lack
of coordinated effort with disastrous results.
They quickly learned from these errors. The
British regular force in Upper Canada was
sparse and spread along a vast border. The
brilliant commander, Isaac Brock, inspired and
trained local militia units, forged alliances with
native allies, and achieved considerable success
by bold action. In so doing, he convinced local
inhabitants, particularly those in the Niagara
region, that invasion could be successfully
resisted.
The Battle at Queenston Heights was a
proving ground for British regulars, militia,
and native allies, who fought together to resist
the invading force. Their concerted effort and
participation in the victory established a new
sense of national pride. Brock’s death leading a
charge to retake Redan Battery gave locals a
hero to emulate and memorialize in speeches,
monuments, anthems, and historic lore.

Elizabeth Snow’s detailed 1975 excavation
report on the Redan Battery and associated
strata provided firm data for reconstruction of the
cannon platform for the Queenston battle walking
tour. Though the archaeological collection she
recovered is small, relics from the War of 1812–
era truly elicit a sense of the height of a battle
fought and won at Queenston Heights. Viewing
these artifacts within the battle context enhances
their meaning, for they are truly evocative of a
place where guns roared and heroes fell.
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